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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates foreign ownership in the Vietnam stock market from 2007 to 
2009 employing a rich and detailed dataset. From the perspective of informational 
asymmetry, the paper examines the relationship between the foreign ownership level and 
attributes of Vietnamese listed firm in Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange. The findings 
of the paper indicate that foreign investors have preference for large firms, firms with 
high book-to-market ratio and firms with low leverage. Foreign investors also avoid firms 
with dominant shareholders and prefer to invest in firms where they can have influence. 
The results imply that foreign investors favor to invest in firms where they can avoid 
informational asymmetry.  
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Foreign ownership in Vietnam stock markets - an empirical analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The flow of funds to emerging markets has increased sharply in recent years. Investor 
interest in these markets surges in response to their prospects for rapid economic growth, 
financial deregulation, and the benefits of international diversification. The Institute of 
International Finance estimates that net private capital flows to emerging economies is 
about $908 billion in 2010, which is 50% higher than in 2009 and projects to grow to 
above $1009 billion in 2012.  
 
Even though Vietnam initiates the stock market later than many other developed 
countries, there has been a substantial growth. The first stock exchange in Ho Chi Minh 
city was established in 2000 with four listed companies. Increased foreign interest and the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises leads to a rapid increase in listings. At the end of 
2009, there are about 250 firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange and the 
smaller exchange in Hanoi.  
 
One of the most prominent features in Vietnam stock markets is the rapid increase in the 
level of stock ownership and trading volume by foreign investors over time. Increases in 
foreign ownership are expected to result in an increases in trading volume, the number of 
trades, visibility and analyst coverage. As the importance of foreign investors in Vietnam 
stock markets increases, both the characteristics of their investment behavior and their 
impact on stock prices are becoming the interesting subject for research.  
 
However, there is not much published research employing a detailed dataset of foreign 
investors’ stock ownership and firm characteristics. This paper is one of the first to 
attempt to fill the gap in this field. In this paper, we characterize the ownership of foreign 
investors in Vietnam Stock markets using a dataset of ownership and attributes of 
Vietnamese firms listed on Ho Chi Minh city Stock Exchange (Hose). In other words, 
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this research will provide answers to the question of which types of firms that foreign 
investors in Vietnam stock markets invest.  
 
 
It is generally accepted that foreign investors in Vietnam behave like institutional 
investors as foreign institutional investors account for a large proportion of foreign 
investment (Coval & Moskowitz 1999; Dahlquist & Robertsson 2001). Therefore, it is 
assumed that foreign investors in Vietnam stock markets share the same investment 
strategy as institutional investors.  Foreign investors tend to be well capitalized foreign 
financial institutions with a long history of successful investment in other stock markets. 
This category is generally composed of mutual funds, hedge funds, and foreign 
investment banks. Foreign investors alone tend to be momentum investors over all 
horizons. 
 
In Vietnam, there is foreign ownership constraints of that foreign investors are allowed to 
own up to 30% in commercial banks and 49% in other listed companies. Therefore, 
foreign ownership is more likely to reflect the investment choices of foreign investors 
with some firm attributes.  
 
It is theoretically argued that investors diversify their portfolio to take advantage of the 
gain from diversification. The benefits of international diversification are well established 
in the literature. French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995), for example, 
argued that diversified international investment dramatically improves the performance 
of portfolios. Theories assuming under-diversification of investor portfolios, such as 
Levy (1978) and Merton (1987) predicts a positive relationship between idiosyncratic 
risk and expected return. However, investors in reality often do not hold perfectly 
diversified portfolios (Fu 2009). In global markets, investors normally have strong 
preference for domestic equities and this is well documented as the ‘home bias’ 
phenomenon Lewis (1999). In addition, global investors do not hold global portfolio as 
predicted by International CAPM as presented by Solnik (1974) but actually consider 
specific advantages when selecting their foreign assets (Rhee & Wang 2009).  
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 The extent of the home bias puzzle needed to be addressed to provide an insight into 
factors drive the deviation from the optimal international equity portfolio. If investors 
more generally already hold the optimal portfolio, then the diversification gains are 
achieved. However, the literature suggests that portfolios are not optimal and that the cost 
in terms of lower return and higher risk is large. Lewis  (1999) argues that costs of home 
bias due to forgone gains from international diversification in the range of 20% to almost 
double of lifetime (permanent) consumption. 
 
The disproportional holding of stocks is not only evident in international investment, but 
also applied to domestic portfolio selection (Coval & Moskowitz 1999; Dahlquist & 
Robertsson 2001). The academic literature attributes the preferences in foreign investors’ 
firm selection to investment barriers and asymmetric information among investors. To 
avoid the informational asymmetry, foreign investors tend to select firms with certain 
characteristics. Results from many studies show that foreign investors favor firms with 
certain characteristics, such as large size and low debt ratio (Dahlquist & Robertsson 
2001; Kang & Stulz 1997; Lin & Shiu 2003).  
 
This paper deepens the understanding of holdings of foreign investors in general and 
holdings of foreign investors in emerging market like Vietnam in particular. By analyzing 
a rich and detailed firm level dataset of equity ownership, and studying the determinants 
of foreign ownership in Vietnamese firms, we identify various firm attributes that are 
common to foreign ownership. In particularly, the paper investigates whether foreign 
investors investing in firms based on some common firm attributes including size, 
dividend payout, firm’s stock return, risk, book-to-market ratio, financial strength, 
financial leverage and firm performance.  
 
In addition, the paper further analyzes the preference of foreign investors for firm’s stock 
liquidity and presence in international markets, measured through export sales or listings 
on other exchanges, seem to characterize foreign holdings better than firm size alone. The 
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paper also considers whether a particular industry is a matter of choice for foreign 
investors. 
 
This paper is one of the very first research carefully investigating the characteristics of 
foreign ownership in Vietnam stock markets. Our main contribution to the financial 
literature is to provide an extensive empirical analysis on the foreign investors’ 
ownership and firm attributes relation over an extended time period. The construction of 
the foreign ownership data, together with the detailed attributes of listed firms in Ho Chi 
Minh City Stock Market, allows us to achieve this task. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews the literature on 
the relationship between foreign ownership and firm attributes. Section three introduces  
data description. Section four presents the research method. Section five reports the 
empirical results. Finally, section six concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
This section reviews the literature on foreign ownership and firms characteristics. There 
is a large and growing literature examining whether foreign investors have information 
disadvantages over domestic traders in developing markets. However, the empirical 
evidence is mixed. In the one side, foreign investors are considered to have significant 
global investment experience utilizing well-developed technology and high-skilled 
financial experts, which suggests they are in a stronger position to evaluate a firm’s 
prospects. Especially in developing countries, foreign investors can take advantage over 
local investors in selection of firms. On the other side, foreign investors may possess 
inferior information due to geological, cultural, and political differences.  
 
However, the impricial evidence is mixed in the literature.  
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Many authors states that foreign investors have better information than local investors 
(Froot & Ramadorai 2001). For examples, Seasholes (2000) employs Taiwan data to 
investigate whether foreign traders have superior information than domestic investors by 
looking at net buying prior to positive and negative earning surprises. This paper’s results 
indicate that foreign investors have superior information over domestic investors when 
foreign investors tend to buy prior to positive and sell prior to negative earnings 
surprises.  
 
On the other side, many researchers argue that foreign investors stand at an informational 
disadvantage relative to domestics. Brennan & Cao (1997) develop a model of 
international equity portfolio flows that relies on informational differences between 
foreign and domestic investors. They find out that U.S. investors being at an 
informational disadvantage relative to locals in foreign markets, and trading on new 
information with a lag. The findings from more recent research by Hau (2001) using 
German data, Dvorak (2005) using Indonesian data, and Choe et al (2005) using Korean 
data are consistent with the argument that foreign investors are of informational 
disadvantage.  
 
The problem of information asymmetry and investment barriers tends to be material in 
emerging markets. Therefore, foreign investors are more likely to depart from holding 
diversified portfolios. Specifically, foreign investors tend to have preference to invest in 
firms with specific attributes. There are many authors tend to agree with this school of 
thought and empirically investigate the link between foreign investors’ ownership in 
domestic market and firm attributes.  
 
Kang & Stulz (1997) examine stock ownership in Japanese firms by non-Japanese 
investors from 1975 to 1991. Their findings are inconsistent with the other existing 
models predicting that foreign investors hold national market portfolios or portfolios 
tilted towards stocks with high expected returns. In fact, this research documents that 
foreign investors in Japan hold disproportionately more shares of firms in manufacturing 
industries, large firms, and firms with good accounting performance, low unsystematic 
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risk, and low leverage. Controlling for size, there is evidence that small firms that export 
more, firms with greater share turnover, and firms that have ADRs have greater foreign 
ownership. 
 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) measure the performance of foreign versus domestic 
investors by comparing a group's tendency to buy future winning stocks and sell future 
losing stocks. Future winning (losing) stocks are those with 6-month returns that fall in 
the top (bottom) quartile. The tendency to buy winners and sell losers is computed as the 
difference between the foreign share in buy volume of winning stocks minus the foreign 
share in buy volume of losing stocks. The measure of performance is intuitive but 
requires judgment as to the horizon at which returns are measured and the thresholds for 
classifying winners and losers. 
 
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) compare the preference of foreign investors to that of 
domestic institutions using Swedish firms listed from 1991 to 1997. This study reveals 
that foreign investors show a preference for firms paying lower dividends, large firms, 
and firms with large cash positions on the balance sheets.   
 
Lin & Shiu (2003) investigates foreign ownership in the Taiwan stock market from 1996 
to 2000. From the perspective of informational asymmetry, foreign investors appear to 
favor large firms and low book-to-market stocks. Analytical results show that foreign 
investors strongly prefer firms with high export ratios with which they are more familiar 
on account of their higher foreign sales. Foreign investors hold more shares of high beta 
stocks than of low beta stocks for small firms. However, this result does not hold for 
large firms, implying that large firms have lower investment barriers than small firms. 
Foreign investors, due to their different tax status, may also hold slightly more stocks 
with low dividend yield. However, evidence for this assertion is inconclusive, with only a 
weak effect displayed by the sample considered in their study.  
 
Using transaction data from Indonesia, DvoŘÁK (2005)  shows that domestic investors 
have higher profits than foreign investors. In addition, clients of global brokerages have 
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higher long-term and smaller medium (intramonth) and short (intraday) term profits than 
clients of local brokerages. This suggests that clients of local brokerages have a short-
lived information advantage, but that clients of global brokerages are better at picking 
long-term winners. Finally, domestic clients of global brokerages have higher 
profits than foreign clients of global brokerages, suggesting that the combination of local 
information and global expertise leads to higher profits.  
 
Ko et al. (2007) examine the foreign and institutional investors’ preference for firm 
attributes in Japan and Korea. There are some important points in their findings. First, 
foreign investors have a clearer preference for stocks with large capitalization and low 
book-to-market ratios than do institutional investors in both Japanese and Korean stock 
markets. Second, foreign investors prefer stocks with a high return on equity, especially 
in Korea. Third, average returns have more apparent differentiation among institutional 
(foreign) ownership portfolios than among foreign (institutional) ownership portfolios in 
Japan (Korea). Fourth, the stocks that are preferred simultaneously by both institutional 
and foreign investors show statistically significant positive abnormal returns in both 
Korea and Japan, whereas those preferred by either institutional or foreign investors show 
statistically significant positive abnormal returns only in Korea. The institutional 
investors’ incentive for stock holding, the extent of stock market efficiency, and stock 
price polarization could be the possible explanations for the different empirical results 
observed for Japan and Korea.  
 
Jeon et al. (forthcoming) examine the relationship between foreign ownership and the 
decisions on payout policy in the Korean stock market. The evidence indicates that 
foreign investors show a preference for firms that pay high dividends. When they have 
substantial shareholdings, foreign investors lead firms to pay more dividends. 
 
However, there is not many research empirically investigating the foreign investors’ 
ownership in Vietnam and Vietnamese firm characteristics. In lieu of the current 
literature, this research enriches the literature by examining whether foreign investors are 
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attracted to some common firm attributes as in previous related studies (Dahlquist & 
Robertsson 2001; Jeon et al. forthcoming; Kang & Stulz 1997).  
 
An aversion towards international investments may also be due to informational 
asymmetries between foreign and domestic investors. Vietnam is an emerging economy 
where there is environment of high informational asymmetry, foreign investors in 
Vietnam are expected to hold more stocks with specific characteristics. This section 
proposes several empirical hypotheses which are consistent with the literature (Aggarwal 
et al. 2005; Dahlquist & Robertsson 2001; Kang & Stulz 1997; Lin & Shiu 2003; Rhee & 
Wang 2009). These hypotheses also allow us to make comparisons between the 
characteristics of foreign investors in Vietnam and other markets.  
 
3. Data description 
 
The data employed in this paper are collected from different sources. The firm attributes 
data are taken directly from financial reports of listed companies. The market data are 
provided by the  in Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange.  
 
We also group the companies in our data set into different industries according to Ho Chi 
Minh City Stock Exchange. There are 9 industries/sectors in our data set including food 
producer, industrial engineering, construction and materials, real estate, general retailers, 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology, electricity, mining, electronic and electrical 
equipment 
 
Foreign ownership level (FOWN) variable is well suited to provide us insights about the 
characteristics and trading behavior of foreign investors. The table 1 below shows foreign 
ownership in Vietnam on a year-by-year basis over the period from 2007 to 2009. 
Overall, the average of ownership of foreign investors increase from 10.16% in 2007 to 
17.46% in 2008, however, it reduces significantly to 14.80% in 2009.  
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[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Firm characteristics:  
 
In this subsection, we briefly introduce a number of firm-specific attributes used in the 
empirical analysis. To enable easy comparison, we first choose essentially the same 
attributes as Kang and Stulz (1997),  Dahlquist & Robertss (2001) and Lin & Shiu  
(2003). These are:  
 
(i) Size: This variable is the market capitalization of the firm at the year-end. In the 
regressions, we consider the log of the market capitalization.  
Merton (1987) and Huberman (2001) argue that investors prefer securities they are 
familiar with. It is more likely that foreign investors prefer to invest in Vietnamese firms 
about which they have some knowledge or familiarity. It is commonly assumed that more 
information is available on large firms than on small ones (Merton 1987). It is argued that 
foreign investors should favor large firms to minimize the negative impact of 
informational asymmetry since the degree of informational asymmetry is higher for 
foreign investors than for local investors. Similarly, foreign investors should favor blue-
chip stocks.  
 
(ii) Dividend yield (DIVY): The value of all dividends paid during the year divided by 
the market value of the firm at year-end.  
 
(iii) Return (RETU): The annual return on the shares of the firm is calculated as the 
cumulative compounded return preceding the year-end.  
 
(iv) Systematic risk (BETA): Systematic risk is the beta coefficient for the market model, 
estimated using the weekly returns. The market portfolio is the value-weighted portfolio 
in our sample. Stulz (1981) developed an international investment barrier model, showing 
that such barriers raise the cost of cross-boarder investments. Accordingly, foreign 
investors seek assets with higher expected returns to cover these costs. We hypothesize 
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that foreign investors who face such barriers hold more shares of high beta stocks, 
yielding higher expected returns.  
 
 
(v) Idiosyncratic risk: This variable measures the residual variance in the market model 
regression using weekly returns.  
 
(vi) Book-to-marke (BMAR): This is a valuation measure of the firm. Growth firms 
typically have low book-to-market ratios, while firms with higher ratios are referred to as  
value firms. The ratio is defined as the book value of equity divided by the market value 
of equity at year-end. Fama and French (1996) proposed the book-to-market equity 
(B/M) as a proxy for profitability and growth. Low B/M firms have persistently high 
earnings while high B/M firms have consistently poor earnings. The future financial 
performance for low B/M firms are more transparent than for high B/M firms. We 
hypothesize that, under such circumstances, foreign investors would hold more shares of 
low B/M firms.  
 
(vii) Current ratio (CURR): We use this as a proxy for short-term financial distress. It is 
calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities at year-end, and measures the 
ability of the firm to meet its short-term payment requirements.  
 
(viii) Leverage ratio (LEVR): This is a measure of long-term financial distress. It is 
defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total equity at year-end.  
 
(ix) Return on equity (ROE): Return on equity is measured as net income divided by the 
book value of equity at year-end.  
 
As mentioned above, we use firm size as a first proxy for how well-known a firm is   
abroad. When we further analyze the preference for large firms, we consider alternative 
variables that proxy for firm recognition and investor influence. These variables are: 
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(x) Export rate (EXPR): Firms with large sales abroad are more likely to be familiar to 
foreign investors. The export rate is measured as export sales divided by total sales.  
 
It is commonly believed that foreign investors are likely to have more knowledge and 
information about firms with high foreign sales than about firms with low export ratios. 
This is based on the conjecture that firms with high export ratio are more widely known 
internationally. To take into account of this behavior, we propose that foreign investors 
favor firms with high foreign sales to mitigate asymmetric information. Kang and Stulz 
(1997), and supports the arguments of Merton (1987) and Coval and Moskowitz (1999). 
 
(xi) Liquidity (TOVR): We employ the trading turnover rate to proxy for liquidity of the 
firm's shares. It is defined as the total value of stocks traded over a year divided by the 
market value of the firm. This is a proxy of liquidity employed by many papers (Brennan 
et al. 1998; Chordia et al. 2001; Datar et al. 1998; Rouwenhorst 1999) 
 
An unresolved area in the field of finance is the relation between share ownership 
structure and liquidity (Rubin 2007). Tesar and Werner (1995) document that the 
turnover rate on international equity investments is high both when compared with the 
turnover rate in the investor's home country, and when compared to the market of the 
foreign security. Their findings suggest that market liquidity is particularly important for 
foreign investors. For this reason, we want to examine whether the implication that 
ceteris paribus, foreign investors prefer to hold liquid stocks is supported by our data as 
stated in many papers (Agarwal et al. 2009; Chan et al. 2005; Covrig et al. 2006; Ferreira 
& Matos 2008; Rhee & Wang 2009).  
 
(xii) Concentration (CONC): This measure of ownership concentration is defined as the 
proportion of votes held by the largest shareholder coalition. Ownership concentration 
measures are also a natural proxy for adverse selection (Rubin 2007). By Vietnamese 
Securities Law, owners who hold directly more than 5% of the firm’s shares outstanding 
must report any transaction to the authorities prior to and after their trading.  
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Moreover, if foreign investors have an interest in the management, we would expect them 
to avoid firms with highly concentrated ownership as in Dahlquist & Robertsson (2001). 
Therefore, we use a measure of ownership concentration to test whether foreigners want 
to be able to directly influence the management of a firm. 
 
(xiii) Volatility of returns (VOLR): This measure the volatility of firm stock returns.  
 
Table 2 presents a description of firm attributes of listed firms in Vietnam.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
4. Research Method 
In this paper, multivariate linear regression analysis is employed to explore the 
relationship between foreign ownership and firm characteristics. The estimated equation 
is a standard linear regression model as follows.  
 
tititi Xy ,,, εβα ++=  
where yi,t denotes the foreign ownership of firm i at time t; Xi,t is a vector that represents 
the firm characteristic variables i at time t ; and εi,t is the error term.  
 
In the first approach, we estimate regressions on a year-by-year basis. The advantage of 
this approach is that every year we can compare the differences in the result. The 
disadvantage of these regressions is that they make no use of the time-series information.  
 
In the second approach, we use panel data regressions.  
 
To ensure the validity of the results, we also conduct several robustness checks. Firstly, 
we run the above regressions with different year. In addition, we also consider whether 
foreign investors favor a specific industry in Vietnam stock market by allowing dummy 
variables to proxy for industry.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
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Table 3 reports the correlation coefficient matrix between foreign ownership and firm 
characteristics for the data set. At first glance it can be seen that foreign ownership 
positively correlates with firm size, beta, book-to-market ratio, current ratio, return on 
equity and export rate. However, foreign ownership negatively correlates with dividend 
yield, previous return, leverage, liquidity and concentration.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In this section, we discuss our regressions results on the relationship between foreign 
ownership and other firm attributes.  
 
Table 4 represent the results of regressions when we run the model for each year from 
2007 to 2009. The findings are as follows. The coefficients of firm size measure are 
positive and significant in each year. Firm size has the largest impact on holding of 
foreign investors. Foreign investors also favor firms with lower dividend yield as the 
coefficients of dividend yield are negative however not statistically significant. Foreign 
investors prefer to hold shares of firms with low leverage. In addition, the coefficients for 
concentration are negative and significant indicating that foreign investors tend to avoid 
firms with dominant shareholders. In other words, foreigners seem to attach significant 
importance to their influence in the firm.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Foreign investors seem to have no preference for firms with high liquid stocks and firms 
with high exports. This is different from the finding of previous research in other markets 
(Dahlquist & Robertsson 2001) 
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
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Table 4 and table 5 reports the panel data regressions. Overall, firm size is positive and 
statistically significant. This confirms that foreign investors in Vietnam have preference 
for large firms. This finding supports the hypothesis of Merton (1987) that investors hold 
shares in firms with which they are familiar and that investors are more likely to be 
familiar with large firms. This finding is also consistent with previous studies (Kang & 
Stulz 1997; Lin & Shiu 2003). 
 
In addition, foreign investors invest more in firms with low debt as leverage measure 
enters the regressions with negative coefficients in all regressions and significant. Our 
result is similar to the finding of Dahlquist & Robertsson (2001).  
 
Book-to-market measure is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. It is also 
of particular note that foreign investors invest less in high current ratio firms. This 
finding contrasts with the result of Dahlquist & Robertsson (2001).  
 
The coefficients of liquidity measure are negative but not significant. Foreign investors 
do not show a preference for high liquid stocks. This finding may indicate that when 
foreign investors invest in Vietnamese firms, they tend to hold to stock in a long term. 
High ownership may make foreign investors corporate insiders. In addition, foreign 
investors employ buy-and-hold strategy and this reduces the need for frequent trading for 
price discovery. This finding is consistent with the results of Amihud and Mendelson 
(1980). Their study formalizes the important link between market microstructure and 
asset pricing and shows that, in equilibrium, illiquid assets would be held by investors 
with longer investment horizons.   
 
Moreover, concentration measure is negative and significant in all regressions. This is 
consistent with the theory stating that foreign investors in Vietnam prefer to invest in 
firms where they can have influence. This might be driven by the fact that most of the 
foreign investors in the Vietnamese market are institutional investors with the buy-and-
hold strategy.  
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One of the interesting points here is foreign investors in Vietnam do not favor shares of 
firms of high export ratio. The coefficients are negative in all regressions even though not 
significant. The result seems to contradict with the hypothesis that foreign investors 
invest more in firms with high export.   
 
We do not find evidence to support the idea of Merton (1987) that foreign investors 
invest more in high export firms as firm export is a proxy for how well know a firm to 
foreign investors.  
 
Table 6 reports the regression results of regressions when we include dummy variables to 
control for industry effect. The results are almost the same with the exception that foreign 
investors invest heavily in pharmacy sector.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
To sum up, foreign investors in Vietnam seem to prefer large firms, firms with high 
book-to-market ration, firms with low leverage and firms with low ownership 
concentration. In addition, foreign investors favor pharmacy firms. The overall evidence 
from the paper indicates that the ownership of foreign investors seems to be driven  by 
informational asymmetry  so that there is a bias in their Vietnamese stock holdings. In 
addition, foreign investors also have a long-term horizon in their investment and follow 
the buy-and-hold strategy.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Foreign investment in Vietnam is an interesting topic on its own merits. Moreover, 
foreign investors are essential in Vietnam market as one of the expected benefits of the 
increasing presence and trading of foreign investors in small emerging markets is that it 
would reduce the informational asymmetry. This study investigates foreign ownership in 
Vietnam, from 2007 to 2010 and identifies the characteristics of listed firm that are 
attractive to foreign ownership in emerging markets.  
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By using a rich dataset on equity ownership and firm-specific attributes, we are able to 
characterize foreign ownership in Vietnamese firms in great details. We find that foreign 
investors allocate a disproportionately high share of their funds to large firms. In 
addition, foreign investors seem to prefer firms with low leverage. Moreover, foreign 
investors avoid firms with dominant shareholders.  
 
In this paper, we have focused on the characterization of foreign ownership and 
investigated the relationship between foreign investor ownership to firm attributes using a 
detailed dataset from Vietnam Stock markets. There are many further issues that are 
worth exploring include how foreigners have performed relative to the general market, 
what determines foreigners' purchases and sales of shares, and how flows are related to 
returns. We hope to be able to address these issues in the near future. 
 
T Description of the Foreign Owners Vietnam able 1 
Year 
hip in 
2007 2008 2009 Whole sample
 Mean  0.10102 0.17453 0.14795 0.14117
 Median  0.02010 0.13490 0.09410 0.08690
 Maximum  0.49000 0.49000 0.49000 0.49000
 Minimum  0.00000 0.00230 0.00370 0.00000
 Std. Dev.  0.14338 0.15116 0.13408 0.14584
 Skewness 
 
1.52871 0.67960 0.85044 0.96442
 Kurtosis  4.26777
 
2.22234 2.55973 2.76642
     
     
   
 Jarque‐Bera  52.03643 11.64799 14.66227 53.79367
 Probability 
 
0.00000
 
0.00296 0.00066 0.00000
 Sum  11.51640 19.89620 16.86610 48.27870
 Sum Sq. Dev. 
 
2.32307
 
2.58208 2.03151 7.25252
 
 Observations   114  114  114  342
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Table 2: Data Descriptive St ics for irm  atist
SIZE 
the f
DIVY 
attributes
RETU   FOWN  BETA  BMAR  CURR  LEVR  ROE  EXPR  TOVR  CONC  VOLR 
Mean  0.14117 11.78717 0.04237 ‐0.12313 0.87681 0.78581 2.46797 1.20587 0.15370 0.15007 0.00514 0.32325 0.03143
Median  0.08690 11.70461 0.03000 ‐0.02327 0.94226 0.61560 1.70891 0.84165 0.14352 0.00000 0.00349 0.28400 0.03114
Maximum  0.49000 13.46383 0.18750 0.85591 2.10943 3.79822 19.48235 7.02120 0.95420 0.99926 0.02585 0.78000 0.09287
Minimum  0.00000 10.71600
 
0.00000 ‐1.13988 ‐2.94911 0.03930 0.11378 0.03191 ‐1.80547 0.00000 0.00016 0.04000 0.01208
Std. Dev.  0.14584 0.61802 0.03861 0.39218 0.37857 0.60820 2.45459 1.18043 0.17184 0.30342 0.00458 0.18471 0.00633
Skewness  0.96442 0.62867 1.12942 ‐0.40621 ‐4.91510 1.50312 3.74682 1.89308 ‐4.01974 1.85018 1.64253 0.36408 4.99761
Kurtosis  2.76642
 
2.80393 4.03238
 
2.28993
 
45.46707
 
5.79550
 
21.21299
 
 
7.09746
 
53.17594
 
 
4.79050
 
5.69777
 
1.98857
 
46.46484
  
Jarque‐Bera  53.7936 23.0759 87.8966 16.5902 27076.2 240.145 5527.11 443.519 36797.1 240.804 257.492 22.1333 28344.6
Probability  0.00000
 
0.00001
 
0.00000
 
0.00025
 
0.00000
 
0.00000
 
0.00000 0.00000
 
0.00000 0.00000
 
0.00000
 
0.00002
 
0.00000
  
Sum  48.2787 4031.21 14.4913 ‐42.1119 299.870 268.745 844.046 412.405 52.5654 51.3247 1.75894 110.550 10.7484
Sum Sq. Dev.  7.25252 130.242
 
0.50823 52.4480
 
48.8709
 
126.138 2054.52
 
475.156 10.0693
 
31.3941 0.00715 11.6335 0.01365
                 
Observations  342  342  342  342  342  342  342  342  342  342  342  342  342 
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Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
  FOWN  SIZE  DIVY  RETU  BETA  BMAR  CURR  LEVR  ROE  EXPR  TOVR  CONC  VOLR 
FOWN  1                         
SIZE  0.2149  1                       
                   
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
   
DIVY  ‐0.0282  ‐0.4135  1 
RETU  ‐0.0905  0.2712  ‐0.3525  1 
BETA  0.0775  0.0480  0.1433  ‐0.1260  1 
BMAR  0.1023  ‐0.5849  0.3936  ‐0.5438  0.1643  1 
CURR  0.0631  0.0822  0.0498  ‐0.0353  0.0220  0.0858  1 
LEVR  ‐0.2725  ‐0.0675  ‐0.0445  ‐0.0539  0.0383  ‐0.1048  ‐0.3908  1 
ROE  0.0188  0.2680  0.1038  0.2781  ‐0.0497  ‐0.3491  ‐0.0088  ‐0.1331  1 
EXPR  0.0563  ‐0.1235  0.1145  0.0145  0.0146  0.1160  ‐0.0274  ‐0.1490  ‐0.0020  1 
TOVR  ‐0.1488  ‐0.1758  ‐0.0909  0.4400  0.0333  ‐0.0596  ‐0.0649  0.0799  0.1063  0.0694  1 
CONC  ‐0.1991  0.2014  ‐0.0404  0.0097  0.0529  ‐0.1584  ‐0.0178  0.1231  0.0106  ‐0.2168  ‐0.3196  1   
VOLR  ‐0.1187  0.0322  0.0130  0.0557  0.2214  0.0274  ‐0.0591  0.0645  0.0328  ‐0.0618  0.1279  0.0055  1 
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Table 4 Regression Results 
  2007 2008 2009 Whole sample
Variable Coefficient t‐Statistic Prob. Coefficient t‐Statistic Prob. Coefficient t‐Statistic Prob. Coefficient t‐Statistic Prob.
‐0.50807 ‐1.12671 0.2625 ‐0.62008 ‐1.55885 0.1222 ‐0.25535 ‐0.68995 0.4918 ‐0.79187 ‐4.00465 0.0001C
0.0015 0.0037SIZE 0.064598 * 1.878543 0.0632 0.098533 ***  3.257056 0.079871 ***  2.975028 0.092163 ***  5.734244
‐0.76356 *  ‐0.01077 ‐0.0479 0.9618
0
DIVY ‐0.99075 ‐0.91771
0.2647
0.361 ‐0.12671
‐0.05116 ‐0.69088
‐0.42456 0.6721 ‐1.94129 0.055
0.4912 0.002477 0.097286RETU 0.09092 1.121581 0.120106 *  1.771444 0.0795 0.9226
BETA 0.4250730.021111 0.931866 0.3536 0.048631 0.6717 0.038055 0.452367 0.652 0.028241 1.423075 0.1557
0.2781 ‐1.06907BMAR 0.093975
‐0.87753
0.68376 0.4957 0.027627 1.090426 ‐0.04092 0.2876 0.064075 ***  3.639947 0.0003
0.2315 ‐0.00626 ‐1.16514 ‐0.00572 * CURR ‐0.0052 0.3823 ‐0.00591
‐3.04982
‐1.20372 0.2467 ‐1.82673 0.0686
0.0029 ‐3.70279 0.0003LEVR ‐0.01348
0.185435
‐0.7635 0.4469 ‐0.03435 ***  ‐0.03537 ***  ‐0.02602 ***  ‐3.80072 0.0002
‐0.21864 ‐1.31437ROE 0.03184 0.8533 ‐0.01413 0.8274 ‐0.13046 0.1917 0.000679
‐0.02198 ‐0.51654 0.6066 ‐0.02328 ‐0.65423 0.5144 ‐0.33339
0.0143 0.9886
EXPR 0.049429
‐1.17848
1.06446 0.2897 ‐0.00803 0.7391
0.4598 ‐2.00451TOVR ‐5.74284 0.2414 ‐11.5633 ‐1.54134 0.1264 ‐1.81678 ‐0.74209 ‐3.94648 **  0.0458
0.0037 0.0674CONC ‐0.25401 ***  ‐3.34422 0.0012 ‐0.22656 ***  ‐2.97553 ‐0.12181 *  ‐1.84887 ‐0.20353 ***  ‐4.83425
VOLR 
0
‐2.34142  *  ‐1.81297 0.0728 ‐8.82929 ‐1.5903 0.1149 ‐12.0944  **  ‐2.58468 0.0112 ‐3.02141  ***  ‐2.63657 0.0088
No. of 
Observations
114 114 114 342
R‐squared 0.228275 0.346897 0.425454 0.252145
Adjusted R‐
Squared 0.136584 0.269301 0.357192 0.224868
F‐Statistics 2.489631 4.470529 6.232591 9.243748
Prob F‐
statistics 0.006708 0.00001 0 0
Note: The dependent variable is FOWN, *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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Table 5 Regression Results 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  None Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) Period fixed (dummy variables)
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.
C ‐0.79187 ‐4.00465 0.0001 0.793273 1.212809 0.2265 ‐0.5744 ‐0.80475 0.4219
0.092163 
*** 
SIZE
5.734244 0 ‐0.04177 ‐0.78066 0.4359 0.075847 1.285698 0.1999
DIVY ‐0.01077 ‐0.0479 0.9618 0.065674 0.274856 0.7837 ‐0.10889 ‐0.46463 0.6427
RETU 0.002477 0.097286 0.9226 0.024956 1.017415 0.3101 0.015064 0.424515 0.6716
BETA 0.028241 1.423075 0.1557 0.006322 0.352974 0.7245 ‐0.00148 ‐0.0847 0.9326
0.064075 
*** 
BMAR
3.639947 0.0003 0.036341 1.536362 0.1259 0.017563 0.752128 0.4528
CURR ‐0.00572 *  ‐1.82673 0.0686 0.001319 0.306698 0.7594 0.003063 0.734321 0.4636
LEVR ‐0.02602 ***  ‐3.80072 0.0002 0.00026 0.024396 0.9806 ‐0.00446 ‐0.4289 0.6684
ROE 0.000679 0.0143 0.9886 0.040855 0.787259 0.432 0.01954 0.388061 0.6984
EXPR ‐0.00803 ‐0.33339 0.7391 ‐0.20451 * ‐1.68355 0.0937 ‐0.19174 ‐1.63418 0.1037
‐4.67072 
**
TOVR
‐3.94648 **  ‐2.00451 0.0458 ‐3.3625 ‐1.5635 0.1194 ‐2.20494 0.0285
‐0.31266 
**
CONC
‐0.20353 ***  ‐4.83425 0 ‐0.3551 ** ‐2.44291 0.0154 ‐2.18156 0.0302
VOLR ‐2.
342
‐3.02141 ***  63657 0.0088 ‐1.29375 0112‐1.2 0.231 ‐1.13957 ‐ 4751.09 0.2749
342 342
No. of 
Observations
0.252145 0.753753 0.772664R-squared
0.224868 0.611249 0.637749
Adjusted R-
Squared
F-Statistics 9.243748 5.289353 5.727057
Prob F-statistics 0 0 0
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Note: The dependent variable is FOWN, *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
 
Table 6: Panel regression results with industry dummy  
 None Period fixed (dummy variables)
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.
C ‐0.85454 ‐4.13456 0 ‐0.71921 ‐3.57643 0.0004
SIZE 0.095883 *** 5.645276 0 0.091895 *** 5.607665 0
DIVY ‐0.0489 ‐0.20982 0.8339 ‐0.39877 * ‐1.71099 0.0881
RETU 0.001695 0.065624 0.9477 0.04286 1.072733 0.2842
BETA 0.02784 1.356585 0.1759 0.010225 0.508632 0.6114
BMAR 0.069451 *** 3.901667 0.0001 0.026521 1.377672 0.1693
CURR ‐0.00763 ** ‐2.32755 0.0206 ‐0.00683 ** ‐2.16692 0.031
LEVR ‐0.02618 *** ‐3.64576 0.0003 ‐0.03177 *** ‐4.5261 0
ROE 0.004681 0.096893 0.9229 ‐0.00559 ‐0.11999 0.9046
EXPR ‐0.03358 ‐1.27335 0.2038 ‐0.02169 ‐0.85181 0.395
TOVR ‐3.90396 * ‐1.9468 0.0524 ‐3.94129 ** ‐2.03848 0.0423
CONC ‐0.24368 *** ‐5.30055 0 ‐0.24448 *** ‐5.53631 0
VOLR ‐2.59289 ** ‐2.23629 0.026 ‐2.90043 *** ‐2.59969 0.0098
D1 0.060707 * 1.684694 0.093 0.045974 1.32235 0.187
D2 0.074104 * 1.884726 0.0604 0.052531 1.383374 0.1675
D3 0.035983 * 1.70522 0.0891 0.030853 1.520213 0.1294
D4 0.033378 0.903154 0.3671 0.032268 0.909212 0.3639
D5 0.005123 0.173103 0.8627 0.013641 0.478551 0.6326
D6 0.013703
342
0.441009 0.6595 0.006952 0.2328 0.8161
0.334972
D7 ‐0.03806 ‐1.0105 0.313 ‐0.05319 ‐1.46549 0.1438
342No. of Observations
R-squared 0.274317
0.291330.231497Adjusted R-Squared
F-Statistics 6.406308 7.675376
 
024
0Prob F-statistics
Note: The dependent variable is FOWN, *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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